The Dublin Review on Developments
Brownson's Quarterly Review, October, 1847
Art. III— The Dublin Review, No. XLIV., Art. III. London : Richardson & Son. July, 1847.
The July number of the Dublin Review contains an article, by one of the recent converts from Oxford, on Doctrinal Developments, professedly in reply to some remarks of ours on the same subject, in our Review for January last. For the obliging terms in which the writer speaks of ourselves personally, he will accept of our grateful acknowledgments ; but he must permit us to say that his article, regarded either as a reply to our remarks, or as a defence of the Theory of Development, has struck us as singularly deficient, and as exhibiting by no means that extensive and accurate acquaintance with Catholic theology which we naturally look for in a contributor to so respectable a periodical as the Dublin Review, the leading Catholic periodical in our language.
We must remark by the way, — and we do so with no disrespect to the distinguished author of the article, — that we regret that the task of replying to us had not been committed to the hands of some learned Catholic doctor, instead of one who, however able and well disposed, can speak on the general subject with no more authority than ourselves, and, from the defect of professional training, is not less likely, perhaps, to mistake the sense of the authorities which must be cited than we are. But our friends in England have the right to select their own champion, and we must, with Divine 'assistance, which we implore, manage our side of the controversy as well as we can.
The article, however, has the advantage of being from a personal friend of Mr. Newman, and a hearty admirer of that gentleman's theory, who is not likely to misunderstand or misstate it. We may, therefore, take it as a good proof of the correctness of our own statement, that it does not in any respect whatever object to it ; but reasserts the theory, both in regard to Christian doctrine and development, substantially as we ourselves understood it. We trust that this will satisfy our friends on this side of the water, that we have not, as some of them have supposed, either misunderstood or misrepresented Mr. Newman.
We understand the writer to concede the correctness of oui representation of the Theory of Developments. If he does, he is bound either to abandon it, or to show that the consequences we deduced from it are not legitimate ; for those consequences, if warranted, prove that it is subversive of Christianity. Unhappily, he does neither. He has left our statement of the theory, our objections to it, and the arguments by which we sustained them, standing in all their force. He has not even pleaded to them. Yet he cannot be unaware that he is held to concede every count in our declaration to which he does not plead, and that we have the right in reasoning with him to assume its truth. This consideration alone sets aside his whole reply.
The theory of Development is a special theory, resting for its logical basis on a certain view of Christian doctrine, namely, that Christian doctrine is not the revealed truth itself, but the mind's idea of it; or that inspiration supplies only the materia informis of doctrine, which is rendered doctrinaformata only by the action of the uninspired intellect, — thus degrading Christianity, by Mr. Newman's own confession, to the level of human sects and philosophies, which is, of course, to deny it. Our main objection was to this view of Christian doctrine, from which developments of doctrine are only a logical deduction ; and we objected to this, not because it authorizes developments, but because it subverts Christianity. The Reviewer by neglecting to plead to this charge concedes its truth, gives us the right to assume it against him, and thus throws himself out of court, or debars himself from the right to enter. He cannot introduce testimony to prove developments in the sense of his theory, because that would be to introduce testimony to disprove Christianity, which is not lawful ; and to introduce it to prove developments in some other sense would be to undertake to prove what is not in question, — an instance of what logicians call ignorantia elenchi.
If held to strict logic, or to the rules of legal pleading recognized by the common law courts, both in his country and in ours, the Reviewer is estopped, and cannot proceed till he gets permission to plead to the charges against the basis of his theory. Till then, his authorities are of no avail; for we have only to reply, your theory is anti-Christian, and you are not at liberty to introduce testimony to prove any thing which is not Christian. If he rejoins, his authorities are Christian ; we reply, again, then they must be understood in a Christian sense, and therefore cannot be understood in the sense of your theory, for your theory is anti-Christian. In any and every possible case, it is more reasonable to suppose that he misinterprets his authorities than that they authorize any thing against our holy religion.
We insist on this for two reasons : — 1. because, if there is to be a controversy on this subject, it must be conducted on strict logical principles, or it will be interminable ; and, 2. because it is precisely in their view of Christian doctrine antecedently to developments, that, in our judgment, the chief error of the Pevelopmentists lies, and it is especially to this point we wish to call their attention. We object to the developments themselves, but because they imply the false view of Christianity entertained by Mr. Newman and his school, rather than to their view of Christianity, because it authorizes the developments. The developments are bad enough ; but their view of Christianity leaves us no Christianity to develop. What we mean is, that, though we object to all developments of doctrine properly so called, when they mean any thing more than new or fuller explications of the faith propter errores insurgentes, we are not so scandalized by them, regarded simply as developments, as we are at the view of Christian doctrine which is set forth as their logical basis. In other words, it is less to the developments than to the theory of developments that we object, and we demand that the controversy turn, as it should, on the theory itself, which we have the right to do, because it was against that we directed our principal attack.
We complain of the Reviewer that he has neglected entirely the logical basis of his theory, and proceeds as if no objections were made to it. We regard a theory as refuted, if refuted in its principles ; for we do not comprehend how a superstructure can stand, when its foundation is taken away. When the foundation of a theory is attacked, we have always supposed that it is that which is to be defended, in order to defend the theory. Now we feel confident that very few can examine the foundation of Mr. Newman's theory without rejecting it ; and we wish especially to call the attention of his friends to its defence, because we think the moment they seriously attempt its defence they will abandon the theory in despair, perhaps in disgust.
But waiving this preliminary objection to the consideration of the theory at all, yet reserving our right to fall back on it whenever we choose, we will, lest the Reviewer conclude that we are objecting to the form of his argument because we are unable to reply to its matter, proceed to consider what he has actually attempted to allege in his defence. He proposes to do three things : — 1. Make as precise a statement as may be of the general principle which seems understood in the language of Mr. Thompson, Mr. Lewis, and Mr. Northcote ; 2. Bring together a sample of the high Catholic authority on which that principle rests ; and, 3. Offer some brief remarks on the testimony we adduced against it (p. 327).
Our readers will perceive that the names of Mr. Thompson, Mr. Lewis, and Mr. Northcote are substituted for Mr. Newman's. Why, we must ask, is this ? The article is professedly a reply to us, and our attack was directed against Mr. Newman, not against these gentlemen, save so far as they may choose to indorse and defend him. Is their theory essentially different from his ? Then we have not assailed it. Is it substantially the same ? Then why defend it under their name rather than his ? Would they appropriate to themselves the honor that is his ? Or have they too profound a respect for him to mention his name ? Or is such their estimation of the theory of development, that they would shield him from its responsibilities ? Our article was directed against his doctrine, as we gathered it from his Essay ; yet the Reviewer, in replying to it, does not once mention even his name. Does he suppose that by suppressing Mr. Newman's name he can deprive him of the glory, or relieve him from the shame, of being the founder and chief of the school of development ? However unwilling his friends may be, either for his sake or their own, that he should appear before the world as the leader of a school, he does so appear, and will, till he either obtains for his theory the sanction of authority or abandons it ; and they, however great their repugnance to be called a school, will be so called, so long as the theory remains unsanctioned, and they are understood to adhere to it. The thing is so and cannot be helped, and they need not seek to disguise it ; for it is not to be presumed that any body supposes, that, if, contrary to the wishes of Mr. Newman, the Church should decide the theory to be not u coincident" with her judgment on the subject, their Catholic faith would be shaken, or they would withhold their submission.
We own, their present attitude towards the Church is exceedingly awkward ; for they are endeavouring to persuade her to accept a theory which she has not taught, but which they devised for themselves, when in transitu from heresy and schism to truth and unity, and when, according to Mr. Newman, they could use " only reason in the things of faith " ; but it is an attitude of their own choosing, and are they the men to shrink from its responsibility ?
It would have been only simple civility to us, if the Reviewer, in making his statement of the principle of his theory, had referred to our statement of it, and either acknowledged its correctness or pointed out its inaccuracies. By doing so, he would have at once put us in possession of his precise thought, and have saved himself from the liability of being misunderstood, and us from that of being found fighting a man of straw. For ourselves, we have supposed, in replying to an opponent, that it is at least civil to pay some attention to what he says,— to his words, instead of being wholly engrossed with our own. But the Reviewer appears to think dill'erently, and we must submit. We have, however, examined his statement with what ability we have, and, supposing him to use language according to its ordinary import, and not, as Mr. Ward said of subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles in a " non-natural sense," we must understand his doctrine to be substantially the same that we ascribed to Mr. Newman, and in what follows we shall assume that it is so. Since, then, all that we have heretofore objected to it stands good, inasmuch as no exception has been taken to it, nothing more is necessary to be added now for the purpose of proving its anti-Christian character. We have already refuted it, and need not to refute it again ; for certainly to ignore an objection is not to remove it. We proceed, therefore, at once to the authorities cited.*(footnote: There, is one point, however, in his statement, to which we take the liberty of directing the Reviewer's attention. In treating the subject of inspiration, and throughout his article, he distinguishes the intc/fcel from the spiritual nature, and proceeds on the assumption, that the truth may be impressed on one's spiritual nature, and the individual nevertheless remain intellectually ignorant of it. We are at some loss to understand this psychology. What does the Reviewer mean by spiritual nature? The inferior nature, which is the seat of concupiscence? Of course not. The rational nature ? But the rational nature, if distinguished from intellect or understanding, is simply the will. If he means by spiritual nature the will, he adopts the Socinian view of inspiration, namely, that it is not the revelation of the truth to the intellect, but a disposing of the will to seek truth, and to embrace and obey it, when found. That is, inspiration is ethical rather than intellectual. We cannot suppose this to be his doctrine, and therefore are unable to imagine what it is he means by the spiritual nature, when distinguished from the intellect. We shall be obliged to him, if be will be so kind as to inform us. Catholic theology can hardly accept the sentimentalism of Jacobi, or the Transcendentalism of Schelling, Cousin, or Coleridge, and perhaps the Reviewer will find it not useless to revise his psychology.--end of footnote).
The Reviewer cites in support of his theory, Petavius, Bel-larmine, Vasquez, Suarez, Cano, Cardinal Fisher, St. Vincent of Lerins, St. Augustine, Moehler, Doellinger, and the Count de Maistre, —authorities enough to establish it, if they were really authorities for it, we are willing to concede. But, —
1. The Reviewer proposes by these authorities to prove developments in the sense of his theory. But these authorities are Christian, and therefore it is to be presumed that they cannot be understood in the sense of his theory, for his theory is to be presumed to be anti-Christian.
2. The theory is confessedly a novelty in Catholic theology ; for the Reviewer says expressly, that he has given his own view because none of his authorities have drawn out a distinct and systematic statement of it (p. 352). But the presumption is against every novelty, and the onus probandi rests upon its advocates. Consequently the Reviewer must prove, not only that his authorities may, but that they must, be understood in the sense of his theory, and cannot possibly be understood otherwise.
3. Since the theory is a novelty, and, as a theory, confessedly not drawn out by the authorities themselves, the Reviewer is not at liberty to conclude it from what they say, even if what they say should seem to imply it. In understanding Catholic authorities, when the point to be proved is a novelty, and for which we have no express authority, the rule of strict construction obtains, and the authorities are to be restricted to what they explicitly assert; for it may be that the author did not foresee the consequences we deduce from his premises, that, if he foresaw them, he denied their legitimacy, or that, if he had foreseen them, and believed them to be legitimate, he would have modified his premises so as to have escaped them. This rule is itself conclusive against the theory ; for it confessedly rests on the explicit authority of no Catholic theologian.
4. Since the theory is confessedly a novelty, and the principal authorities adduced in its support all flourished before the close of the seventeenth century, and some of them before the close of the fifth, without its having been hitherto deduced from them, the presumption is that they do not warrant it; for if they did, we may reasonably conclude that it would have been drawn from them before now. It is true, the Reviewer says (p. 352), that " it is in accordance with, it is only an instance of, the principle he contends for, that development should be developed " ; but the petitio principii is not a respectable figure of logic, and it is not allowable to assume development as the medium of proving development.
5. It is a still further presumption against the supposition that the authorities cited warrant the theory, that no Catholic has ever so held. The theory is not only a novelty, — in Catholic theology, we mean, for in Protestantism it is no novelty,— but a novelty that comes to us from without; and it cannot be supposed for a moment that an Anglican minister, as Mr. Newman was, though in transitu from heresy and schism to truth and unity, however great his abilities, deep his religious feelings, extensive his learning, or sincere and honest his intentions, yet destitute of the graces of the Sacraments, and uninitiated into the science of Catholic theology, should better understand Catholic theologians than they understand, or have hitherto understood, one another.
6. The more especially is this to be said, when the theory is confessedly adopted as an hypothesis, as an expedient for
getting rid of a difficulty which cannot, without heresy, be assumed to be a difficulty at all. We are bound as Catholics to take our reading of history and philosophy from the Church, and not our reading of the Church from history and philosophy. The theory implies that the teaching of the Church is to be taken from history and philosophy, and says so and so the Church must have believed, because so and so history and philosophy, as we understand them, teach, — the very error broached by Abelard in his Introductio ad Theologian, for which St. Bernard so sharply censures him, and which is at least the seminal principle of Rationalism.
7. We insist on these presumptions, themselves in fact conclusive, not because we propose to avail ourselves of them to much extent in solving the difficulties suggested by the authorities cited, but because we wish the Developmentists to perceive their exact position and its responsibilities. It would not surprise us, if, in ranging through the long catalogue of Catholic theologians, who have discussed all manner of subjects, in every possible point of view, and, first or last, emitted many singular opinions, some half a dozen should be found who have said things which an ingenious fancy or a subtle speculator may, when taken from their connection, detached from the special purpose of the writer, and from the general principles of theological science which must restrict their meaning and application, develop into a sense not absolutely unfavorable to the theory in question. But this, if so, is nothing to the purpose. Single doctors are not to be interpreted by a theory invented especially for their interpretation, but by a rule drawn from the gener al current of theology. What they say which appears exceptional must, as far as possible, be reduced to the rule, and what cannot be so reduced must be regarded as a private opinion, at best as a sententia in Ecclesia, notas sententia Ec-clesue, and therefore as unauthoritative, on which we can never venture to build any thing to be put forth as the doctrine of the Church. Nothing is more unscientific, nothing theologically more reprehensible, than to rove through the multitude of doctors, seize upon their private opinions, their incidental expressions, their obiter dicta, their special solutions of special problems, as primitive data, and generalize them into a theory to be henceforth taken as the sense of Catholic doctors, and the recognized doctrine of the Church of God. And yet this is an exact description of what is done, or attempted to be done, by Mr. Newman and his school; and their theory is at best, in its most innocent statement, simply a theory for proving that the sentential in Ecclesia are the true and proper sentential, Ecclesice, as they themselves virtually, if not expressly, maintain. What else is the meaning of such a sentence as this ? " In fact, it is only in accordance with, it is only an instance of, the very principle we have been contending for, that development should be developed ; that a principle on which the Church has ever proceeded [unconsciously for the most part, pp. 300, 301], and which her greatest doctors have from time to time recognized and fully allowed, should at last, by the progress of controversy, have to be drawn forth into a consistent and systematic theory " (p. 352).
But, in addition to this, we must remark that the Reviewer has enumerated in his article six classes of developments, and confessedly cites authorities for only the last two. Why is this ? Do these two include the other four ? If so, his classification is unscientific. If not, if the six classes are mutually distinguishable, per diffcrentiam, how conclude the truth of the four from the proof of the two ? Is this accidental, the result of a loose manner of thinking, and of an unscientific manner of writing ? or is it designed, and intended to enable the Reviewer, in case his proofs should turn out to be insufficient to prove the developments in the special sense to which he adduces them, to insist that he has nevertheless sustained his theory, if they are found sufficient to prove them in some other sense which he has recognized ?
The first class of developments described, but taken for granted, are those which scandalize us the most, because they strike at the Mystery of the Trinity, the foundation of the Christian profession, are those on which Mr. Newman places the greatest reliance, and from which he draws the principal illustrations of his theory ; and, also, because they are those on which the weight of authority is overwhelming against him. To assume, as the Reviewer does (p. 329), that the doctrine of the Trinity was only imperfectly understood and believed before the Nicene Council, to assert of the Ante-Nicene Fathers generally, that in treating this Holy Mystery they erred in thought and expression, held opinions subsequently condemned by the Church, and yet were far from " doctrinal error," and to assume such a horrible doctrine as a matter of course, as a thing which will be admitted without controversy, is presuming a little too much on the ignorance, stupidity, or indifference of the Catholic public. It is not less scandalous than the reason the Reviewer assigns, near the close of his article, why his theory, as some have objected, will not impair the evidences of Christianity ; namely, that the argument it impairs can affect only a limited class of persons ! (p. 353) ; that is, the ignorant may have as good evidence as they had before ! But waiving this, we come without further preface to the two kinds of developments which the Reviewer does attempt to prove, and to the authorities he cites in their support. These are what he calls ethical developments and logical developments. We begin with the ethical.
1. An ethical development, according to the Reviewer, " arises from the gradual action of the Christian mind upon revealed truths or principles," is u the gradual growth of an idea under the influence of pious meditation and practical realization" (p. 332). As an instance of what he means, he cites the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the ever-blessed Virgin. His positions with regard to this doctrine are two: — 1. The doctrine is an ethical development ; 2. It can be defined to be of faith. His conclusion is, if this can be, then the whole class of ethical developments. To prove his two positions he cites Petavius, Vasquez, and Suarez.
But what are these ethical developments ? Whence originates the idea which gradually grows under the influence of pious meditation ? Is it the revelatum itself ? No ; for if it were, it would not be a development. Is it an idea implicitly contained in the revelatum 9 No ; for if it were, it would be a logical development, not ethical, since it is by a logical and not an ethical process that we draw forth from one truth another which it implicitly contains. What is it, then ? It can be nothing but an idea, a pious thought, which springs up in the Christian mind on the occasion of meditating on the revealed truth or principle. Then it is either a special revelation to the pious mind, or it is an idea furnished by the pious mind itself. In either case, it is not a doctrine contained in the word of God, written or unwritten, but something which the Christian mind, by natural or supernatural means, adds to it. This is what the writer must mean, if he distinguishes, per differentially ethical from logical developments. The simple point for the Reviewer to prove, then, is, that an idea of this sort, after having floated for a while in the minds of the faithful, and become a prevailing opinion, may be defined de fide. The simple statement is sufficient to prove the contrary.
Such being an ethical development, it will be seen at a glance that the Reviewer, by assuming the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception to be an ethical development, denies it to be an Apostolic tradition, and supposes it to be a mere pious thought which some day sprang up in some devout mind while meditating on the glorious privileges of the Blessed Virgin, or at best a private revelation made subsequently to the time of the Apostles, and therefore in either case incapable of being defined de fide, because it has not and cannot have the formal reason of divine and catholic faith. This is a bold denial to begin with,— a formal decision, on private authority, of a question which many people have supposed could be decided only by the public and infallible authority of the Church. Many of the faithful have cherished the hope that the Church would one day decide the doctrine to be of faith ; for they have believed it to be a doctrine of Apostolic tradition, though less explicitly recognized by the early Fathers in their writings than it is now ; ior, as Suarez says, they were engaged in matters of more pressing moment, having to defend the very foundation of the Christian profession of faith. Perhaps these will not agree with the Reviewer in his decision, which, if sustained, cuts off the hope they have cherished.
But do the authorities sustain the Reviewer ? In order to do so, they must prove two points : —• 1. That the doctrine is an ethical development ; 2. ^ That it can, being such, be defined of faith. Petavius gives it as his private opinion, that the doctrine is not of faith, that is, is not an Apostolic tradition,— and he may have considered it to be something approaching what the Reviewer calls an ethical development, or rather he in fact held it to be supernatural, and a posterior revelation, by ordinary or extraordinary means, to individuals ; but he says nothing as to its capacity to be defined of faith. This was not his problem. His problem was, how to account for a belief so extended and so firmly held, not taken from the Scriptures, not known to be a doctrine of tradition, which has never been defined by the Church, and has been denied or doubted by many eminent doctors and saints. And he attempts to solve it by representing the belief to be revealed in the sense recognized by St. Augustine in the passage he cites from him, and which he contends is sufficient to produce in individuals, without a decision of the Church, " what the Greeks call TrXr/po-(fyopiau and the Latins firmam persuasionem." The presumption is, that Petavius did not imply or believe that the Church could decide it to bo of faith.*(footnote: * Petavius, De Incarnalione, lib. 14, cap. 2, sec. 8-11.) The authorities Petavius cites are cited to prove this view, and, as it is not a view we now controvert, they are not against us.
Vasquez, in the passage cited, does not represent the doctrine as an ethical development; he only maintains that an argument not light for its truth may be collected from private revelations, miracles, and the common consent of the faithful, since the time of St. Thomas, who doubted the doctrine, — a fact which we have never heard questioned. Suarez says the doctrine may be defined of faith, but denies it to be an ethical development ; for he says expressly, that to such a definition " some supernatural truth contained implicitly in tradition or Scripture " is necessary, as we read in the place cited by the Reviewer. Here is all the proof of ethical developments which the Reviewer has adduced, and it amounts to nothing. But, even if his authorities were express to the points to which he adduces them, they would avail him nothing, for he would have even then only an opinion in the Church, which is not authoritative for doctrine.
The Reviewer should have selected an instance of unquestionable ethical development, already defined to be of faith. One such instance would have decided the question at once and for ever. Perhaps he had no such instance to adduce, and therefore is not to be blamed. As to the question, whether the Immaculate Conception can be defined of faith, we have nothing to say ; for it is not the question before us. The question before us is, whether, if it be a mere ethical development, it can be so defined. This the Reviewer asserts, but fails to prove. For ourselves, we are content to await the action of the Church, and not to take it upon us to advise her what she ought to do, or what we wish her to do. It is hers to teach, ours to believe ; and we have no wishes but hers on the subject. With these, when made known to us, we will do our best, grace assisting us, to comply.
2. So much for ethical developments ; we pass now to the logical developments. " The various kinds of development already mentioned," says the Reviewer (p. 333), " by bringing consciously before the mind propositions which before were there only unconsciously or even only potentially or in germ, lead to a last kind, viz. logical deductions from themselves." Logical developments are, then, logical deductions from developments, that is, developments of developments. A slight objection occurs in limine to these logical developments, namely, the reality of the developments from which they are logical deductions does not appear to be proved. The first four are confessedly left without proof, affirmed, in so far as developments, gratuitously; and the fifth, we have just seen, is not sustained by the authorities. But let this pass ; for we assure our Anglican friends that it is not the only instance in which they seem to us to imagine that substantial conclusions may be drawn from unsubstantial premises.
For this class of developments the Reviewer cites Melchior Cano, Vasquez, Bellarmine, and Suarez. The point he wishes to establish by these authorities is, as we understand it, that logical deductions from developments, interveniente Ecclesim definitione, are de fide divina et catholica. Do these high authorities prove this point ? We begin with Melchior Cano, the writer who, in the judgment of the Reviewer, has come nearer than any other named to giving a distinct^ and systematic theory of developments. He is the principal witness introduced, and the Reviewer says,— " The fact of his having taken part in the Council of Trent gives of course an especial weight to his judgment on points such as these " (p. 341). Let us examine his testimony.
The Reviewer has two points to make out: — 1. That, interveniente Ecclesice definitione, logical deductions from developments are de fide ; and, 2. That, the definition of the Church intervening, the developments from which they are deductions are also de fide. His doctrine must be, that theological conclusions may be defined of faith, and when they are, they become the principles of new conclusions, and these again of another series, and so on, for aught that appears, ad infinitum. Does Cano say this ? He shall answer in a passage the Reviewer has himself cited (p. 338). Cano, we must premise, is discussing the formal reason of faith and theology, and defining what are the proper principles of the science of theology, or from which, by the natural light of reason, theological conclusions may be deduced. These, he says, are not so diffuse and ample as some people imagine ; and, after excluding every thing the ratio formalis of which is not prima Veritas revelans et Ecclesia Catholica proponens, he says, " They are all those things which are divinely revealed through the Sacred Authors." He then proceeds to define who are sacred authors, and restricts them, in a word, to our Lord himself, and to the Prophets and Apostles. Then follows immediately the passage cited, the precise purpose of which is to show that councils, pontiff's, and doctors are not sacred authors. Thus he says, — "Although the authority of Councils and of the Apostolic See, as well as the consent and one accord of the Saints, makes the faith of the Catholic dogma certain, xoe do not therefore accumulate principles of theology or extend its formal reason. Because, as I have often elsewhere said, neither the Council, nor the Sovereign Pontiff, nor the Saints, interpreters of the Scriptures, put forth for the faithful new revelations ; but either hand down to posterity integral and untarnished those which the Church has received from the Apostles, or express and interpret them ; or at least collect (colligunt) their consequences and things connected with them, and manifest the things which are adverse and repugnant to them." *(footnote: * De Locis Theologicis, lib. 12. cap. 2.)
This is a faithful and exact translation of the passage the Reviewer cites ; and this, unless we are altogether mistaken, is so far from sustaining his doctrine, that it is point blank against it. A better text against development we could not have wished. It certainly denies absolutely the first point, deductions from developments, for it denies all accumulation of principles of theology, or extension of its formal reason.
The Reviewer, however, we infer from his Italics and his comment, fancies that he finds his developments asserted in the third thing specified which Cano says is or may be done by the Council, the Pontiff, or the Saints. He reads colligant where we read colligunt, and seems to translate, mentally, colligare consequentia, to deduce consequences. Or, be it that he understands it to bind up or connect with the Apostolic revelations their consectaria et connexa, we do not see how that favors development. Who ever denied to the Church the right to draw inferences, or even in her definitions to condemn the denial of the certain deductions from the faith ? But to do either is a different thing from defining the consequentia et conncxa, or annexa, as the Reviewer reads, to be of faith, — the point we deny, and which was to be proved.
But this passage itself proves, that, in the view of Cano, they could not be defined of faith, properly so called ; because, if they could be, they would, since they would then be portions of the Catholic faith, be principles of theology, and then by their definition there would be an accumulation of the principles of theology, or an extension of its formal reason, which is what Cano expressly denies. If the Reviewer had analyzed the passage, he would have seen that it condemns his whole theory of development under any and every possible aspect. There cannot be development without new credibilia, as the Reviewer himself cites Suarez to prove; and there cannot be new credibilia without an accumulation of principles of theology or an extension of its formal reason ; for each new credibile becomes a new principium theologim. If no new prin-cipium theologian, then no new credibile, and then no development. It is the Reviewer's own witness that authorizes this conclusion, so express against him.
But we will not rest on mere reasoning, however certain and conclusive. The Reviewer would persuade us that Melchior Cano held that theological conclusions, or deductions from the faith by the light of reason, are de fide. Now Cano has discussed this question ex professo in the fourth chapter of his De Locis, the chapter immediately preceding the one from which the Reviewer cites three passages to prove his position. The title of the chapter is Quae sint Qucestiones, seu Conclusiones Theologicce. Near the close of the chapter he says : —
" Fidei porro qucestio bifariam intelligitur: una, qua? immediate ad fidem attinet, ut vere attinent omnia, qua? Deus Ecclesiaa suce verbo edidit, aut scripto; altera, quoc mediate fidei est, cujusmodi sunt omnes conclusiones, quas or dine disciplines ex illis prioribus colligere et definire possumus. Qua3, quoniam non in se ipsis, sed in aliis tamquam principiis revelatre a Deo sunt, mediate fidei di-cuntur esse, et qui eas negat, is fidem negare hoc modo dicitur. Atque equidem illud etiam animadverto, eas non abs re forsitan qucestiones fidei vocari, quo) vohementer ad Ecclesicc doctrinam pertinent, fideique sunt propter affinitatem appendices; ?wn quod aut ex its pendent fides, aut Us sublalis funditus ilia tollatur, sed quod afiecta aigraque sit, si harum rerum Veritas labefiat, qua3 illi hrerent et acljunguntur. Oportet nempe in Ecclcsia sanam doctrinam esse et verbum sanum, ut Apostolus ait, 1. ad Tim. 1. 10, et alibi passim. Quemadmodum autem morbi quidam lethales sunt; alii vero non interficiunt quidem hominem, sed afiiciunt tamen vale-tudinem ; sic errores quidam non fidem exstinguunt, sed obscurant; non evertunt, sed infirmant; morbumque affbrunt, non exitium. Sicut ergo quod saluti est noxium, vitce id quoque noxium est, ita quodcumque sanae doctrinal adversatur, hoc fidei est etiam quodam modo adversum. Ex quo intelligitur, qucestiones illas quce doctrinal Ecclesiastical, sanitatem spectant, ad fidem in suo quodam modo spectare, sed 7ios hujus generis controversias non in fidb proprie, sed propter idem esse dicimus; nee qui in his errant, eos in fide, sed prater fidem errare existimamus."
And again, at the conclusion of one, and just preceding another passage cited by the Reviewer, and which must have been under his eyes, — " Nee enim sic fidei adhserescunt, ut sepa-rari ab ilia non queant. iEgrotat sane, ut ita dicam, in earum errore fides, non pent."
This is sufficient; for it cannot be necessary to add, that to deny any proposition of faith is mortal, and does not merely obscure or weaken the faith, but kills it outright. The Reviewer's witness is decidedly against him ; yet we agree that " the fact of the author having taken part in the Council of Trent of course gives an especial weight to his judgment on points such as these."
It is easy to understand the Reviewer's mistake. He apparently, at least, confounds in his own mind Christian doctrine and theology. If he had distinguished between Faith and the science of theology, between the sources of the former, and the sources of the latter, and borne in mind that Cano was professedly treating tie Locis Theologicis, whence arguments may be drawn to elucidate and defend the faith, or to refute its adversaries, he would have understood what is said of initiis and seminibus not of the beginnings or seminal principles of the faith, or what is revealed only seminally or potentially, but of the science of theology, and not have claimed him as an authority for developments of which he was, as we had supposed was well known, one of the sturdiest opponents.
Vasquez we must reluctantly pass over, for we have not access to his works, and it is impossible to determine, from the brief citation the Reviewer has made, whether the theological conclusions he asserts may be defined de fide are of the class which we admit may be so defined, or of the class which we assert cannot be. From what we know of him, however, we presume his doctrine on the point to be that of Suarez, and, if so, it will be answered in what we say of Suarez himself. Bellarmine will by and by explain himself. The only point to which he is cited is, that evident deductions from the word of God, written or unwritten, are of faith, which in one sense we concede, and nothing proves that this is not Bellarmine's sense. If the Reviewer contends to the contrary, he must prove it; for the onus probandi is upon him, since all the presumptions are against him. We proceed, therefore, at once to Suarez, the Reviewer's chief witness after Melchior Cano.
Suarez is not an author for a novice like ourselves to grapple with. He was a great man, and, since the Schoolmen, none have surpassed him, although his opinions on school questions may sometimes be disputed, and we have been more accustomed to see them cited to be controverted than as authority. As an authority he is no doubt high, but by no means so high as St. Thomas, nor, on a question of Catholic doctrine, higher than Bossuet. Nevertheless, we have no reason to be dissatisfied, and we hope the Reviewer will continue to be satisfied, with him. We shall, in what we say, confine ourselves to the citations of the Reviewer, and assume that they are correctly made. In the place cited, Suarez asks, " whether, in the Church of Christ, as to some propositions to be believed de fide, in later times, which before were not explicitly believed as of faith, the faith has grown," and answers : —
" From what has been said the negative appears to follow ; for the infused wisdom in this Church cannot increase even extensive, otherwise the later pastors of the Church might surpass in this wisdom the Apostles. Also, there are in this Church no new revelations, and therefore no new credibles. And, finally, so the scholastics above cited appear to think, saying that the faith of the Church is not augmented as to the number of credibles, but is only further explained. St. Thomas also says on this question, that nothing is taught by the Church not contained in the doctrine of the Apostles, but the faith is further explained and proposed to the faithful on account of heretics [St. Thomas says, contra errores insurgen-tes]; whence also VValdens says, the Church explains the ancient faith, but cannot found a new article ; so also deliver Castro and Cano."
Thus far Suarez gives the reason and authorities for denying that there can be any increase of the faith in the lapse of time, even in the restricted sense of his question ; and, what we wish our readers to bear in mind, for a reason which will by and by appear, he understands St. Thomas in the very sense we ourselves did. Is Suarez about to deny what is here adduced ? Or is he about to introduce something which will essentially modify the plain and natural sense of what is here said ? he is, here are strong reasons and fearful odds against him. But, after referring us to the part of his work in which he treats the subject ex professo, he continues : —
" I say, therefore, briefly, that it is to be simply asserted, indeed, that the Church never gives a new faith, but always confirms and explains the ancient; and so also teach the ancient Fathers, St. Vincent of Lerins, Contr. Profan.Voc. Novit. c.7, &c.,St. Irenajus, Contr. Hares., and St. Jerome on that Psalm, Dominus narrabit in Scripturis populorum et principum horum qui fverunt in ea where he explains this word fuerunt so as to show that those princes were the Apostles."
This is express. For there cannot be development without new credibles, and new credibles cannot be proposed without the proposition of new faith. Whatever modification of this Suarez may contend for, he can contend for nothing corresponding to the developments in question, without contradicting himself. But let us read on.
" Yet notwithstanding this, it is still true that there is some proposition— aliquampropositionem — now explicitly helieved of faith, which was not formerly explicitly believed by the Church, although implicitly contained in the ancient doctrine. The examples above cited prove this; and it is best proved by that of baptism given by a heretic in the form of the Church: Whether is it valid, or to be repeated ? For in the time of St. Cyprian neither was of faith, and therefore, although he himself, and the Pope, St. Stephen, held the opposite opinions, they nevertheless remained in the union of the same faith, for St. Stephen defined nothing. But afterwards it was delivered of faith, that such baptism is valid and not to be repeated ; and many similar instances may be adduced ; and this unquestionably relates to the defining power of the Church. Nor is a new revelation necessary for this, but the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost suffices for explicitly defining and proposing what was already implicitly contained in revelation, — revelatis. And so the authors are to be explained. For the explication, they say, the Church can make [subintellige, propter err ores insurgentes], is sometimes by the explication of a new proposition contained in the ancient. But this proposition is never a new article, because it does not pertain ad materiam veluti substantialem of the faith to be explicitly believed by all,— for that was always sufficiently explained in the Symbol,— but it often pertains to the doctrine of faith, which it behooves the doctors of the Church to know according to the varieties and the necessities of the times."
Here the Reviewer fancies that he finds his theory of developments ; but he is mistaken. Suarez asserts here only two things:
1. The faith may be further explained and proposed contra errores insurgentes, according to the authorities, — as was the validity of baptism in the form of the Church by a heretic* against the error of St. Cyprian,—as was the doctrine, that " in Christ there are two natural wills and two natural operations," against the heresy of the Monothelites, — or as the doctrine,
that " the substance of the bread does not remain after consecration," against the Berengarians and the Consubstantialists, and others of a like kind ; — and, 2. That this explication is sometimes, not always, but sometimes, by the explication of a new proposition contained in the ancient. Here is all that Suarez asserts. The whole question between us and the Reviewer turns on this new proposition, by the explication of which the explication of the faith is sometimes made contra errores insur-gentes. What is this new proposition ? First, it is not a proposition of faith, properly so called, for Suarez expressly places it within the province, not of the Ecclesia docens or proponens, but of the Ecclesia defmiens, for he says, it without any doubt relates to the defining power of the Church. It is, then, necessarily, not something new proposed by the Church, but a new proposition defined by the Church. Secondly, it is never a new article, because it does not pertain ad materiam veluti substantialem fidei, to be explicitly believed by all, since that was always sufficiently explained. It cannot, then, be a development ; for it is undeniable that the development in the sense of the theory is a new article, proposes new faith, if not quoad materiam, at least quoad formam, and it is precisely of formal faith Suarez is speaking. This is decisive against the Reviewer. And lastly, it often pertains to the doctrine of the faith, which it behooves the doctors of the Church to know. Yet not these at all times, but only juxta varietatem et neccssitatem lem-porum. But, as the faith to be believed by all was always sufficiently explained, the doctors can need this, not to propose or to explain the faith propter fidcles, but only for the avoiding of error, or the defending of the faith against errores insur-gentes. Make what you will of it, then, its explication can be only the application of the faith held from the beginning to the definition of some new proposition which the Church, in the discharge of her mission, in space and time, encounters ; and therefore is only what we ourselves, under the head of negative developments, admitted in our article against Mr. Newman. Thus far, then, Suarez not only does not recognize the Reviewer's developments, but clearly condemns them ; for all the explication of the faith, which he thus far admits, is propter errores insurgentes, and such explications of new propositions of the faith held from the beginning, as are necessary for the avoidance or the condemnation of these errors. Such explications we of course admit the Church can make, and is bound to make. But Suarez concludes : —
" In fine, as to what relates to the Apostles, we may distinguish a twofold order of propositions which are explicitly believed in the lapse of time ; for some pertain, as it were, to the substance of the mysteries, — as in the mystery of the Incarnation, Christ has two wills, — and in that of the Eucharist, the substance of the bread does not remain after consecration, &c.; and we must believe those of this kind were known by the Apostles not only implicitly, but explicitly ; because they had the fullest understanding of the Scriptures and all the mysteries which pertain to the tradition of faith. But the others are contingent propositions of what in the time of the Apostles had not yet happened, — such as this man (Pius IX., for instance) is Pope, this council is a true council, &c. ; and it was not necessary that the Apostles should have known these explicitly, it sufficed to know them in the universal; for it was not necessary that all future things should be revealed to them. And in this way, perhaps, they were not explicitly instructed on the day of Pentecost in all the mysteries, as to all their circumstances, such as the manner of calling the Gentiles, and of the cessation of the Jewish legal rites, as may be plainly collected from Acts x. and xv. And thus also St. John, in the Apocalypse, understood many things of the future not revealed to the others, and perhaps many of them will not be certainly and explicitly known till they come to pass. Thus in the knowledge of these things the Church may make progress, even with the certitude of faith, by the intervention of the definition of the Church, which, because of the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost, has the force of revelation, or infallibly applies the revelation of the universal to the particular object." *(footnote: * Suarez, Da Fide. Disput. $2, sec. 0, as cited by the Dublin Review.)
Here is the whole text cited by the Reviewer, and which we have taken the liberty to translate for the purpose of more easily marking the sense in which we understand it ; we find it a clear and express statement of the doctrine we hold, and an equally clear and express condemnation of the Reviewer's. Suarez asserts distinctly two orders of propositions which are explicitly believed in the lapse of time : 1. Certain propositions which pertain veluti ad substantiate mysteriorum ; and 2. Certain contingent propositions of things, which in the time of the Apostles had not yet happened. The first order includes the propositions which Mr. Newman and his friends rank under the head of developments. This is undeniable, for they expressly teach that the doctrine of the Two Natural Wills was a development, and Suarez expressly cites this as an instance of the first order of propositions which, he contends, are explicitly believed in the lapse of time. This being evident, they claim Suarez as authority for developments ; this being evident, we claim him as express authority against them. The explicit-ness acquired in the lapse of time by this whole order of propositions must be understood, not quoad fideles, but quoad hcv-reticos or errores insurgentes ; because, 1. Suarez asserts that these propositions — therefore the Reviewer's developments — pertain veluti ad subsiantiam mysteriorum, and from that fact argues that they must have been explicitly known by the Apostles ; 2. Because he has just said that what pertains ad mate-Ham veluti substantialem fidei, which we understand] to be the same thing, was always sufficiently explained, that is, quoad fuleles ; and, 3. Because he denies that the new proposition — by the explication of which that explication is sometimes made which the authorities say the Church can make propter hiereti-cos — is ever a new article, and does so on the ground that it never pertains ad materiam veluti substantialem fidci. Either, then, Suarez contradicts himself, which it will not do to suppose, or the first order of propositions explicitly believed in the lapse of time, and which include what Mr. Newman and his friends call developments, belong veluti ad substantiam mysteriorum, and were explicitly known by the Apostles and always sufficiently explained, quoad fideles. Then the explicitness acquired in the lapse of time, which he predicates of them, can be explicitness only contra errores insurgentes, which is the express doctrine of St. Thomas, and which we maintain. Mr. Newman and his friends evidently cannot assert developments on the authority of Suarez, for the doctrines they term developments he asserts positively were explicitly known by the Apos-ties,and always sufficiently explained, and, moreover, excludes from these the neiu proposition by the explication of which the faith is sometimes further explained on account of errors which spring up.*(footnote: * This is conclusive against the Reviewer. He must say, either that his developments are included in the first order of propositions defined by Suarez, or that they are not. If he says the latter, he must concede at once that Suarez is against him, because he excludes them from the number of propositions which, Suarez says, are explicitly believed in the lapse of time; if he says the former, which he does and must, if he pretends to cite the .authority of Suarez in his favor, he must also concede that Suarez is against him, for then he expressly says they were, explicitly known by the Apostles, and always sufficiently explained.)
Moreover, we are compelled so to understand Suarez, not from his own words only, but in order to save him from contradicting the express testimony of Scripture, of Pope Agatho, and the Sixth (Ecumenical Council. He gives as an example of his first order of propositions, the doctrine that Christ has two wills. If we suppose him to maintain that this was only implicitly believed at first, and has been explicitly believed only in the lapse of time, we must suppose him to maintain that it was not tie fide prior to its definition against the Monothe-lites, and then that before that definition the dogma of the Mo-nothelites was not a heresy, — a proposition which we cannot persuade ourselves Suarez was the man to maintain; for we say with Tournely, — " Contendimus cum Scrutinii doctrina-rum auctore [Antonius de Panormo] anlecedenter ad sextum Concilium (Ecumenicum ha)reticum Monothelistarum dogma. Id clare demonstrant Scripture et Sanctorum Patrum testimo-nia, quibus duas in Christo voluntates probant sexta) Synodi Pa-tres: Non mea sed tua voluntas fiat, Luc. xxii. 24 ; Nonsicut ego volo, sed sicnt tu, Matt. xxvi. 39 ; — unde in Epistola Syno-dica Agathonis ad prsefatam Synodum directa habetur : Juxta quod Frophetce olim de Christo, et ipse nos erudivit, et Sanctorum Patrum nobis tradidit Symbolum, duas naturales voluntates in eo, et duas naturales operationes prcedicamus." *(* De Locis Theologicis, De Censuris, art. 2. Vide etiam Per rone, De Incarnatione, p. 2, cap. 4, propositio.) We must, therefore, understand the explicitness predicated to be not of the doctrine considered in its relation to the faithful, but considered in relation to the errors which contradict or impugn it. In regard to the first order, then, Suarez asserts nothing that we have denied, or which we did not expressly admit; consequently, again, he does not assert the developments the Reviewer maintains, otherwise the Reviewer would not have undertaken to prove any thing against us ; but instead of smiling at what he calls our stationariness of doctrine, he would have shown us that we concede all that he and his school contend for. There remains, now, only the second order of propositions. Suarez unquestionably means to maintain that there is besides the new explication of the faith which is made propter hmrclicos, as he says, — propter errores insurgentes, as we say after St. Thomas, for a reason obvious to every theologian, — there is another sort of explication which may be made with the certitude of faith propter fideles, and without a new revelation, in regard to which the Church may be said to make progress. These are the second order he describes,—including the new propositions, by the explication of which he says the faith is further explained and proposed on account of errors which from time to time are encountered by the Church, — and which are expressly defined to be cc contingent propositions of what in the time of the Apostles had not yet happened." These he contends the Church may define with the certitude of faith, by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, without a new revelation, because in defining them she only applies the revelation of the universal, which she has received from the Apostles, to the particular object. The positive progress, or development, if you choose, of the faith which he admits is, then, restricted to this class of propositions, which pertain rather to the mission of the Church in space and time, than to her faith, strictly so called, and are, therefore, propositions of fact rather than of law. The Reviewer will find them discussed at great length under the head of Dogmatic Facts by almost any of our modern theologians ; and if he attends to the controversy which grew out of the condemnation of the five propositions from the book of Jansenius, he will find much to satisfy him that his doctrine of development cannot be admitted by Catholic theology. So far as concerns ourselves, we admit the doctrine of Suarez with regard to these contingent propositions, for it is only the application of the revelation of the universal to the particular, which, in our article last January, we conceded might be made with the certainty of faith; for what is revealed as the particular in the universal, or as the part in the whole, we concede, being formally revealed, is, accedente Ecclesim definitione, de fide.
If the Reviewer had attended to the sense of Suarez, he would have seen that what Suarez contends for is nothing but his own third class of developments, namely, the authoritative application of old principles to new cases, which even the Reviewer himself seems to doubt can be made with the certainty of faith ; for he represents it as only u the opinion of many theologians." Is the Reviewer turning against himself ? But, * by the way, who before ever regarded the application of the faith to the definition of a new question as a development of doctrine ? In making such application there is no development of the faith, for the decision requires only the application of the standard which the Church has had from the beginning in Scripture and tradition. Suppose the Church knows the faith beforehand ; she then knows all that she needs to know in order to decide in relation to any question what the faith is, or what it is not. The question is always one of identity. She knows always what is not faith by knowing what is faith, as God knows evil by knowing its opposite, good.
But we have almost lost sight of logical developments in following Suarez, who was cited to prove them. As logical deductions from developments we may dismiss them without further comment, for the Reviewer has cited no authority for them, and his own witness, Cano, positively denies them. One word, however, on logical conclusions, properly so called, and we will conclude this part of the discussion. The Reviewer has cited Bellarmine in a passage which we shall cite at length, in a moment, against his conclusion, to prove that what is evidently deduced from the word of God, written or unwritten, or what is revealed only mediately in Scripture or tradition, is de fide, which appears at first view to be at variance with the doctrine we maintain, and for the Reviewer. But it is admitted by all that there is a class of deductions which are de fide, such as are evidently deduced from premises, both of which are revealed truths. With regard to these there is no dispute with the Reviewer. Besides these there are what are called u theological conclusions," or conclusions evidently deduced from premises, one of which is de fide, the other certain by the natural light of reason. These, again, are divided into two classes, — those in which the conclusion is revealed as the part in the whole, or the singular in the universal, as Christ died for me is revealed in the proposition, Christ died for all men ; and those which are revealed only as the effect in the cause, or the property in the essence, as Christus est risibilis is revealed in the proposition, Christus est homo. The first of these two classes, it will be seen, are the contingent propositions of which Suarez speaks, and which he contends, interveniente Ecclesice definitione, are de fide. With regard to these, again, we have no controversy with the Reviewer; for though they are not explicitly revealed quoad nos, they are formally revealed, and have the ratio formalis fidei. The controversy turns on this second class. These we deny to be of faith, because they are not revelata. Thus, Omnis homo est risibilis; atqui Christus est homo; ergo, Christus est risibilis. Here the conclusion is evidently not revealed ; for the fact on which it depends for its cause, namely, that risibility is a property of human nature, is not a revealed truth, and is certain only with the certainty of natural reason ; consequently, the conclusion is certain only with the certainty of natural reason. It is revealed that Christ is a man, but the truth we apply to him, for the reason that he is a man, is not revealed, nor made more certain by the truth that is revealed. That conclusions of this class are not de fide, prior to the definition of the Church, is certain. Thus Tournely, ubi supra: —" Conclusiones mere et vere theo-logicas ex duabus pracmissis, quarum una est de fide, altera ve-ro lumine naturali nota, certo et evidenter deductas, non esse
de fide......Ita Gregorius, Major, Gabriel, Cajetanus, et Thomistae, Salamanticenses, Cardinalis de Lugo, Lorca, Valentia, Molina, Antonius de Panormo, et alii passim, quos refert et sequitur Suarcz. Disput. 3, de Fide, sect. 11, nu. 3, 7, et 10. Here is the authority of Suarez himself, and we have already had that of Cano, that theological conclusions are not de fide, at least prior to the definition of the Church, and we have found no theologian who contends that they are.
But if they are not revealed truths, — if they are truths certain only with the certainty of natural reason, — they cannot, without gratia inspirations, be defined de fide; for the ratio formalis fidcih, as St. Thomas teaches, prima Veritas revelans, and, as all agree, of divine and Catholic faith, prima Veritas revelans et Ecclcsia proponens. But these, not being revealed truths, want the first essential condition, the prima Veritas or Deus revelans, and therefore cannot be of faith. In proof of our conclusion we cite a passage from Bellarmine, a part of which the Reviewer has cited to prove the contradictory.
" Prima igitur regula est, Quando universa Ecclesia aliquid tam-quam fidei dogma amplectitur, quod non invenimus in divinis litteris, necesse est dicere, ex Apostolorum traditione id haberi. Ratio hujus est, quia cum Ecclesia universa errare non possit, cum sit columna et Jirmamentum veritatis, 1 Tim. 3, et cum de ea dictum sit a Domino, Matt. 16, Porta inferi non prccvalcbunt adversus earn; certe quod Ecclesia de fide esse credit, sine dubio est de fide; at nihil est de fide, nisi quod Deus per Apostolos aut Prophetas reve-lavit, aut quod evidenter inde deducitur. Non enim novis revela-tionibus nunc regitur Ecclesia, sed in iis permanet qua) tradiderunt illi, qui ministri fuerunt sermonis, et propterea dicitur, Eph. 2, JEdificata supra fuadamentum Apostolorum et Prophetarum. Igitur ilia omnia, qua) Ecclesia fide tenet, tradita sunt ab Apostolis, aut Prophetis, aut scripto, aut verbo. Talis est perpetua virginitas beata) Maria?, numerus librorum canonicorum, et similia." — De Verbo Dei, Lib. 4, cap. 9.
This, if we understand it, is conclusive. The Church cannot define that to be of faith which she does not believe to be of faith ; for her definition is only the solemn profession of her faith on the point defined. She cannot believe that to be of faith which is not of faith. These conclusions are confessedly not of faith before she defines them, and therefore she cannot define them to be of faith ; otherwise she could solemnly profess to believe what, at the time, she does not and cannot believe. Thus, again, Tournely, ubi supra.
" Sententiam banc exponit et probat Scrutinii auctor, cap. 3, art. 5, nu. 19-22, et pro hac citat Waldensem, Alphonsum a Castro, Lorcam, Canum, et Thomistas communiter, Molinam, Va-lentiam, Hurtadum, Tannerum, &c. In hanc sententiam coincidit opinio lllustrissimi Tutelensis Episcopi, in suo de elementis theo-logicis tractatu, ubi docet, id numquam committere posse Ecclesiam, ut meras conclusiones theologicas tamquam ad fidem Catholicam pertineant, declaret."
To the same effect Veronius, in his De Regula Fidei Catholicae, cap. 1, sect. 1 et 2. " Illud omne et solum est de fide catholica, quod est revelatum in verbo Dei, et propositum omnibus ab Ecclesia Catholica." — " Duo debent conjunctim adesse, quo doctrina aliqua sit fidei catholica?. Alterum, ut sit revelata a Deo, per Prophetas, Apostolos, seu auctores canon-icos. Alterum, ut sit proposita ab Ecclesia. Si utrumque adsit alicui doctrina?, ilia fide divina et catholica est credenda ; si alterum desit, seu revelatio, seu propositio Ecclesia?, non est fide divina et catholica credenda." This tract of Veronius was so highly esteemed by the Brothers Walenburch, that they adopted it in place of one of their own. To the same effect also we may refer to Melchior Cano, — already cited through Anto-nius de Panormo, an acute and learned author, who was Con-suitor to the Congregation of the Index, and Qualificator In-quisitionis Romce, — De Locis Theologicis, lib. 12, cap. 2, a good authority in the estimation of our friend the Development-ist. Silvius, also, a passable authority, may be adduced, Sum-ma 2, 2, Qusest. 1, art. 7 : — Erat quidem fidei, priusquam dejlniretur ab Ecclesia, et consequenter opposilum tenentes jam turn errabant in fide, sed inculpabiliter ; quia non errabant in fide definita et declarata." We may also cite St. Thomas, although the Reviewer does not appear to esteem him very.highly : — " Sic igitur in fide si consideremus formalem rationem objecti, nihil est aliud quam Veritas prima. Non enim fides de qua loquimur, assentit alicui, nisi quia est a Deo revelatum. Summa 2, 2, Qusest. 1, art. 1. And, finally, we cite the following from St. Augustine, which we find in Bellarmine : — " Si quis sive de Christo, sive de ejus Ecclesia, sive de qua-cunque alia re, qua? pertinet ad fidem, vitamque nostram [vestram, ed. Main*.], non dicam, si nos, sed quod Paulus adjicit, Si Jlngelus de ccelo vobis annuntiaverit, praiierquam quod in Scripturis legalibus, et Evangelicis accepistis, anathema sit." St. Aug., lib. 3, Contr. Litt. Petti., cap. 6.
We might multiply authorities on this point to any extent, but these must suffice for the present. If theological conclusions themselves, for the reason that they are such conclusions, are not de fide, do not pertain to the objectum materiale fidei, then a fortiori not logical deductions from them. Consequently our friend's class of logical developments dissolve, and, " Like the baseless fabric of a vision, Leave not a wrack behind."
We have said for the reason that they are such conclusions; for nobody questions, that propositions, dogmas, articles, which are a parte rei logical conclusions from others, may be proposed and defined de fide; or that the fact that they are logical conclusions may be appealed to by the Church and by doctors, as evidence of their truth, and as a conclusive reason why they must be believed, and cannot be denied without injury to the faith ; but the Church can never appeal to this fact as the motive of her decision, since the faith can never be discursive, and the Holy Ghost does not need syllogisms. The conclusions are defined, ex parte definiente, to be of faith, not because they are conclusions, but because they are revelata, and have the formal reason of faith, Deus revelans. The Church often prefaces her decisions by arguments, drawn sometimes from reason, sometimes from tradition, more frequently from the Scriptures ; but she does so in respect of those who are to receive her decision, not to set forth her own motives, for the motive of her decision is always visum est Spiritui Sancto et nobis. Strange as it may seem, it can hardly be doubted that neglect to consider this very obvious fact is one of the most active causes of the mistakes and false reasoning of the Devel-opmentists in regard to theological conclusions.
We have but brief space to remark on the other authorities cited, and who are cited, not to prove any particular point, but developments in general. Moehler was a distinguished theologian, but needs to be read with care, and to be cited with caution, not so much because he is not sound, as because he deviates much — at least in the English translation, and we have not read him in the original — from the usual mode of presenting Catholic truth, and from the ordinary language of theologians. The passage cited, however, confirms our doctrine. Thus he says: — " One doctrine of faith hath subsisted, and must subsist, through the whole history of the Church. We will not and cannot believe otherwise than as our fathers have believed," p. 345. We can conceive nothing more express against development than this. What follows speaks only of the progress that is made, not in the faith, but in science, in the scientific view which the mind takes of the several articles of faith in their mutual relations, in their connections, and general bearings,--that is, as we said, a progress not in the faith, but in that which is not it; and in this very sense, Moehler, the Reviewer's own witness, understands St. Vincent of Lerins, as appears from the citation itself. That by this the faith gains in clearness, light, evidence,--in its relations, not in se,--we suppose few have been disposed to deny.
The Reviewer cites anew a passage from St. Vincent of Lerins, which we ourselves cited, Comm. 1, cap. 23, but wholly disregards what precedes and follows it, and which must be taken into the account, if we wish to determine its sense. St. Vincent of Lerins most certainly does speak of a gain, profit, or increase (profectus fidei) of the faith in the process of time. Nobody denies this. But what does he mean? He himself tells us, in the clauses which the Reviewer discreetly suppresses, and in what immediately follows:--"Fas est etenim prisca illa coelestis philosophiae dogmata processu temporis excurentur, limentur, poliantur; sed nefas est ut commutentur, nefas ut detruncentur, aut mutilentur. Accipiant licet evidentiam, lucem, distinctionem, sed retineant necesse est plentitudinem, integritatem, proprietatem." Hence the holy Doctor defines what the faith gains, namely, evidence, light, distinction. Does the Reviewer maintain that the evidence, light, distinction, furnished to the faith by science and study, are a progress in the faith, or sapientia infusa itself? Are they not evidently a progress, a development, not in it, but in that which is not it, and which is clearly distinguishable from it? If so, were we deserving the Reviewer's sneer for representing the gain of the faith to be only in relation to that which is not faith?
Of De Maistre we have little to say. He is neither a Father nor a Doctor of the Church; he writes as a statesman and politician, not as a theologian; and is always more commendable for the rectitude of his heart, and for his erudition, than for the critical exactness of either his thought or expression. The passage cited, when the motive with which it was written is taken into the account, may be easily harmonized with the doctrine we set forth, but, as we should never think of citing the distinguished author as a theological authority, there is no necessity of doing it. Cardinal Fisher, if correctly cited, which we very much doubt, was wrong in his facts, and his opinion only goes to the point, that every portion of the faith may not be equally known at all times by every individual teacher, nor in all times and places set forth in the same special prominence, — a fact of which we need not go far to find an illustration. The citation from St. Augustine is only to the same effect; or, at most, to the effect, that, in some portion of the Church, some things, more immediately connected with the practice than with the dogmata of the Church, may become obscured, and so obscured that a man who errs in respect to them may be inculpable, till the matter is investigated, thoroughly sifted, or an authoritative decision on the subject is had. St. Augustine brings forward this as a ground on which to excuse St. Cyprian, and Bossuet takes the same view in his correspondence with Leibnitz ; but it is easy to see that the holy Doctor does not depend much upon this, and that he relies at last almost entirely on St. Cyprian's martyrdom as washing out his fault in his blood. We have found in St. Augustine no hint that the baptism in question was not, in St. Cyprian's time, de fide. The passage from Doellinger says nothing more than we have ourselves said in both of our previous articles against developments.
We here close our comments on the sample of the Catholic authority on which the principle of development rests. Of the authorities cited, not one is express for the Reviewer ; De Maistre is not himself authority, and as he cites no authority for his opinion, it is of no avail, even if it must be understood in the sense of the Reviewer, which we deny. Vasquez, as cited, may be interpreted to favor a collateral point, but nothing proves that he must. Doellinger, Cardinal Fisher, and Peta-vius are not for him ; St. Augustine, St. Vincent of Lerins, Suarez, Bellarmine, and Melchior Cano are decidedly against him ; and yet this is a sample of the high Catholic authority on which the principle rests ! In this we are happy to agree with the Reviewer.
A few words will suffice to dispose of the remarks which the Reviewer offers on the testimonies we introduced. He can find only three : a condemned proposition, a citation from St. Thomas, and another from Bossuet. So he counts for nothing
the express testimony of St. Vincent of Lerins, who lays down the rule, ut cum dicas nove, non dicas nova; for nothing, the testimony of holy Fathers and Councils cited by Bossuet. But let this pass. In regard to the first, he " desiderates a reference," which he shall have, if he will inform us in how many different senses the term science of morals, taken strictly, may be used, or is used by Catholic theologians.
To the citation from St. Thomas, express to our purpose, he replies : — " The passage from St. Thomas, it will have been seen, is quoted also by Suarez in the passage above cited ; and he says it must be understood in that very sense to which Mr. Brownson regards it as the contradictory." p. 351. It will have been seen, as we requested our readers to bear in mind, that Suarez says no such thing, but cites St. Thomas in the very sense we did. The assertion of the Reviewer we must regard as a — development.
As to Bossuet, the Reviewer says his testimony is suspicious. He was a Gallican, had a case to make out, — that of " preserving a merely external and hollow similarity with earlier times," — was at issue with the profoundly learned Petavius, and actually joined in a vote of thanks to Bull, an Anglican schismatic, for his defence of the Nicene Creed. This, it strikes us, has been said inconsiderately. Bossuet is high Catholic authority, and, on a point of faith which he has treated ex professo, second to none in modern times. He was eminent among the most eminent; he was the unwearied and successful defender of the faith against enemies within and enemies without, and the whole Catholic world has been eager to acknowledge the services he rendered to his religion ; he has never been convicted, and, so far as our knowledge extends, never accused, of a single error on a point of Catholic faith ; and his works are a vast treasure-house of profound and varied erudition, — of philosophy, history, eloquence, and piety. It will not be to the Reviewer's credit to call the testimony of such a man suspicious; for most people will be inclined to regard him as a better authority, on any point of Catholic faith and theology, than our recent converts from Oxford ; and if they are found maintaining, as they are, by the concession of the Reviewer, a doctrine contradictory to his, suspicion will be more likely to light on them than on him.
But the Reviewer is apparently mistaken as to the affair of Petavius. We have before us, in his first Admonition to Protestants, Bossuet's defence of Petavius, where he vindicates him, in the words of Petavius himself, from ever holding or countenancing the doctrine he was accused of holding, and for which the Reviewer would by implication claim him as authority. Petavius never held the doctrine of development, but has given, in his Preface to his De Trinitate, a most masterly refutation of it. # Besides, he retracted, as Father Zaccaria, in a little apologetic appendix to the Preface, just mentioned, informs us, the chapters — third, fourth, and fifth of the first book, De Trinitate — in which he had cast some suspicion on the orthodoxy in thought or expression of a very few of the ante-Nicene Fathers ; and those very Fathers, Zaccaria, in his notes to those chapters, has successfully vindicated from all suspicion. We refer the Reviewer to the Works of Petavius, folio edition, Vol. II., Venetiis, 1757.
That Bossuet joined in a vote of thanks to Bull for his Defence of the Nicene Creed we have no authority for denying; but Bull in that work was simply defending a Catholic dogma — the foundation of the profession of the Christian faith — and^ Catholic Fathers with Catholic arguments, not his Anglicanism. Does the Reviewer think Bossuet could not, with a good conscience, thank him for this ? Be it so. The Reviewer rejects the testimony of Bossuet. Then Bossuet was wrong. Then the Protestant minister Jurieu, who maintained the opposite doctrine, was right. The Reviewer, then, sides with the Protestant, whose purpose was to overthrow Catholicity, against the Catholic bishop who was defending it. Again ; Bossuet, in his correspondence with Leibnitz on the Project of Union, asserts in still clearer and more distinct terms the same doctrine as that of the Catholic Church : Leibnitz, for the purpose of obtaining an argument against the infallibility of the Church, denies that it is the doctrine on which she has proceeded, and cites the very instances the Reviewer cites against us, to prove it. But Bossuet was wrong ; therefore Leibnitz was right, and the Reviewer sides with the Rationalistic Leibnitz opposing, against the Catholic bishop defending, the Church ! This is no scandal. The scandal, it appears, is only in thanking the schismatic or the heretic, when he is defending a Catholic dogma and Catholic Fathers with Catholic arguments.
As to Bossuet's Gallicanism we have nothing to say, for it does not relate to a question of faith. We are ourselves Ultramontane, of the extreme right; but Gallicans are Catholics as well as we, and have the same right to maintain their opinion that we have to maintain ours. We have no right to condemn a man whom the Church does not condemn ; and certainly we shall not coincide with the Reviewer in the doctrine, that a man who has, as we believe, erred in a matter of opinion can never be cited as authority on a question of faith in which it has never been pretended that he has erred. The allegations of the Reviewer are not sufficient to impeach the testimony of Bossuet.
But it was not, as the Reviewer leaves his readers to infer, simply as authority that we introduced Bossuet. We introduced him as one who had discussed the question of development ex professo, and for the facts, arguments, and authorities he adduced against the Reviewer's doctrine. These spoke for themselves, and were conclusive, without taking Bossuet's personal authority into the account. It was the duty of the Reviewer to reply to these ; for even if he could have impeached Bossuet, these would still remain to be answered. The Reviewer does not seem to us to be aware that he is not at liberty to treat objections to his theory, when gravely urged and well put from respectable sources, with disdain. To do so smacks of Oxford rather than Rome ; for among Catholic theologians it is a point of honor and of conscience to meet objections fairly, and to respond to authority by authority, and to solid reasoning by solid reasoning.
Here we might close, but we make a few additional remarks in hopes they may save us from the necessity of recurring to this painful subject again. The Catholic doctrine on the subject under discussion, as it has been taught us, is, that our Lord has made a full and perfect revelation of all that is, or is to be, received de fide, and that he has instituted his Church, and committed to her this revelation as a sacred deposit, to be preserved and transmitted without addition, diminution, or alteration, and that with regard to it, assistente Spiritu Sancto, she exercises the functions of an infallible witness and teacher, and an infallible judge of all controversies which arise respecting it in space and time. Testis, magistra, judex comprehend the whole of her functions in regard to the faith, so far as relates to the question before us. She bears witness to the deposit and its faithful preservation ; she proposes what she has received to the faithful ; and she decides every dispute which may relate to it, and infallibly; for He who commissioned her abides with her, and she has at all times, in each of her functions, the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost.
As testis and magistra, she certainly does not develop. This is evident from the force of the word witness, from the terms
of the commission, u Teach all nations.....to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you," St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20, and from the promise of the Holy Ghost, namely, tc who will bring all things to your mind what' soever I may have said to you," St. John xiv. 26. Also in what St. Paul says to St. Timothy :— " O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane novelties of words, and oppositions of knowledge falsely so called, 1 Tim. vi. 20 ; as St. Vincent of Lerins teaches. " Quis est hodie Timolheus," asks this holy doctor, u nisi vel generaliter univer-sa Ecclesia, vel specialiter totum corpus Pra^positorum, qui in-tegram divini cultus scientiam vel habere ipsi debent vel aliis infundere ? Quid est depositum custodi ? Custodi, inquit, propter fures, propter inimicos, ne dormientibus hominibus, superseminent zinania super illud tritici bonum semen, quod seminaverat Filius hominis in agro suo. Depositum, inquit, custodi. Quid est depositum °J Id est, quod tibi creditum est, non quod a te inventum ; quod accepisti, non quod excogitasti ; rem non ingenii, sed doctrinal, non usurpations private, sed publica) traditionis ; rem ad te perductam, non a te prolatam ; in qua non auctor debes esse, sed custos ; non institutor, sed sectator ; non ducens, sed sequens. Depositum, inquit, custodi ; Catholics fidei talentum inviolatum illibatumque conserva. Quod tibi creditum, hoc penes te maneat, hoc a te tradatur.
Aurum accepisti, aurum redde......Eadem tamen quae didicisti doce, ut cum dicas nove, non dicas nova." Comm. 1, cap. 22.
It is not possible for language to be more explicit, and on this point we have found no disagreement among our theologians, and their uniform doctrine is admirably summed up and set forth by our own theologian, the learned and venerable Bishop of Philadelphia, in his excellent Theologia Dogmatica, Vol. I., pp. 221-228, where he gives, in establishing the perpetuity of the faith, as conclusive a refutation of the theory of development as any one can desire. Father Perrone clearly sustains the doctrine we set forth ; so does the learned and scientific Dr. Wiseman. Indeed, the point is of faith, and not debatable; for the Holy Council of Trent, session 4, in the Decree on the Canon, expressly declares that those things, and those only, can be held of faith, which are contained " in libris scriptis, aut sine scripto traditionibus, qua) ipsius Christi ore ab Apostolis accepta?, et ab ipsis Apostolis, Spiritu Sancto dietante, quasi per manus trad-it®, ad nos usque pervenerunt." No ingenuity can possibly develop transmitting a doctrine from the Apostles to us, as it were by hand, into development. Handing down a doctrine can never be developing it.
This point settled, it is determined that there can be no positive developments, for the Church as judex does not propose faith, but simply defines it. If, as witness and teacher, she is restricted to the depositum, so must she be as judge of controversies. The limitation of that which she can witness to having received is the limitation of that which she can propose, and the limitation of that which she can propose is the limitation of that which she can define dejide.
Such is the Catholic doctrine as it has been taught to us. The Church witnesses infallibly to the deposit, proposes infallibly what she has received, and when controversies arise, when innovators, men fond of the profane novelties of words, or only partially instructed, bring in errors which obscure, undermine, or in any way impugn it, she infallibly declares it and condemns them. Such explications of the faith as are necessary for its preservation, and for the clear and distinct application of it to the condemnation of whatever opposes it, she can of course make ; for this comes within the province of the judge who applies the law. That by these explications the faith becomes more definite, that is, its boundaries are more clearly and distinctly marked, and it is better understood in relation to what is not faith and to what cannot be maintained without directly or indirectly impugning the faith, nobody, to our knowledge, disputes. The only point disputed is, that the faith opposed to the novel error is a new proposition of faith quoad fideles. The faithful knew it before its application, and explicitly believed it ; only they did not know explicitly that it condemned the error, because they did not know explicitly the error itself. As faith, it was explicitly believed before the application ; as explicitly condemning the error, it was only implicit. So in the application, there is no change, no development, no advancement of the faith, no extending the faith over new territory, or taking up new elements into it, but simply its explicit application to the definition of points which it was not before explicitly known that it condemned. The analogy to the civil judge in the application' of the law is perfect. The judge has no legislative function, and can only define and apply the law. So with the Church in her judicial character.
The Developmentists appear to us to have fallen into their error by not keeping these several functions of the Church distinct, or rather by supposing that the Church ivitnesses and proposes only in defining. They sink the Ecclesia docens in the Ecclesia definiens, and hold that nothing is authoritatively proposed of faith, except in its authoritative definition. Thus the Reviewer says, p. 348, — u Indeed, our doctrine is implied of necessity in the language so universally held by Catholics, as to the essential importance of the attribute of infallibility ; without which, we always say, there would be a series of endless and hopeless controversies. For how would this be the case, if the Church always held exylicitly and consciously the contradictory to a heresy before that heresy sprang up ? What need is there of infallibility to declare that Rome is in Italy V* While this passage makes us thrill with horror, we are glad that it is written ; for it will show our Catholic friends that we do not mistake the theory of development. Here it is plainly asserted, or necessarily implied, that the essential importance of the attribute of infallibility is for the determination of controversies ; that the Church does not explicitly and consciously hold the contradictory of a heresy till that heresy springs up ; and that, if she did, there would be no more necessity of an infallible Church to propose the faith, than to declare that Rome is in Italy. It is clear, then, that the theory maintains that the attribute of infallibility comes into play only in the act of defining the faith ; therefore, that the Church infallibly proposes the faith only in defining it. But since the Church never defines a point before it is controverted, it follows necessarily that there is infallible proposition of the faith only after it has been controverted, and only in proportion as it is controverted and defined ! Do our friends now understand the theory of development ? And after this will they censure us for opposing it ? Hence it follows necessarily, since the authoritative proposition of the faith is in its authoritative definition, the contradictory of a heresy cannot be held explicitly and consciously till the heresy has arisen,—the second point the Reviewer asserts. So the Church did not and could not explicitly and consciously hold the doctrine of the Trinity before the contradictory heresy sprang up ; the consubstantiality of the Son, before Arius ; the one person in two natures, before Nestorius ; the two forever distinct natures in one person, before the Euty-chians ; the two natural wills and two natural operations, before the Monothelites ; and so of all the points which have in the lapse of time been defined. Do not accuse us of misrepresentation. Read the article in the Dublin Review, read Mr. Newman's Essay, and you will find not only that this follows as a consequence, but that it is explicitly asserted ; and, in Mr. Newman, attempted to be demonstrated philosophically, and historically verified. Hold this for certain, that the Develop-mentists found their theory on the assumption, that the first formal proposition of the faith, saving a few elementary ideas, is in its first formal definition. If, then, it had so happened that there had been no resistance to the faith, not a single article, even to this day, could have been completely, distinctly, and consciously held by the Church. On their principles, the Church has attained to a consciousness of her faith by means of the successive errors which have controverted it.
There is something in the doctrine of the Reviewer which strikes us with more horror than even this. He asks, " What need is there of infallibility to declare that Rome is in Italy ? " None, if you are to believe the fact with only human faith. But if you are to believe it with Catholic faith ? This is the question. Has the Reviewer ever made an act of faith ? May we ask him what is the objectum formale quo seu sub quo fulei di-vinm et catholicoz ? Has he studied his Tractates de Fide ? If he has, he knows that the objectum formale quo or the ratio formalis fulei divinoi et catholicm is the prima Veritas revelans et Ecclcsia Catholica proponens, and therefore that he cannot make an act of faith except in that which God reveals and the Catholic Church infallibly proposes. We could hardly have supposed it could be necessary to remind even a Catholic child, who has been taught his catechism, of this fact.^ It follows from this that the attribute of infallibility is as necessary to propose what is explicit and consciously held, as it is to define the faith on the points which are controverted. The question of the Reviewer marks the character of his theory, and betrays an ignorance of the simple conditions of Catholic faith which we should not have marvelled at in a Protestant, but which in a Catholic is as astonishing as it is deplorable.
After this, it is easy to comprehend the Theory of Development. God has made his revelation once for all, and, as Mr. Newman says, " thrown it upon the concourse of men." On a few essential or seminal points it is clear and explicit from the first; all the rest is preserved in the Scriptures, and unconscious traditions of this concourse of men. As time rolls on, a portion so preserved, which makes no part of the explicit or conscious teaching or belief of the Church at the time, is detached, floats in the minds of the faithful for a while, in the state of opinion. Some maintain that it is of faith ; others that it is not ; gradually a controversy arises on the point, and waxes warm ; authority then intervenes, and defines and proposes the point, and what was opinion is now de fide. Here is a development. Soon another portion is detached, floats for a while as opinion, is controverted, then defined, then proposed, and is another development. Then another, and then another ; and the process may continue, for aught we know, and the whole revelation not be all developed, defined, and proposed, till the consummation of the world. Here is the theory in a nutshell.. It satisfies the condition of the perpetuity of the faith, as it is supposed, by asserting that nothing is defined and proposed not contained in the original revelation ; and the demand of the age for a progressive faith, by assuming that it is only according to the progress of controversy, and the advance of the age, that it is developed, defined, and proposed as de fide. We entreat our Anglican friends either to deny or to confirm this. How they can deny it we do not see, for it is really nothing but the statement the Reviewer himself makes officially in the article before us, reproduced from the Catholic point of view. If they acknowledge it, will they oblige us by drawing up a complete list of the articles and dogmas, or parts of articles and dogmas, now taught, which they class under the head of developments, and maintain were not explicitly and consciously held by the Church in the primitive age ? We have ourselves prepared a list for them, but we withhold it, preferring, if more must be said on the subject, to be furnished with one from themselves.
Taking the theory as we understand it, the Developmentists fall into this error by overlooking the fact that the Church infallibly proposes the faith before she infallibly defines it. The Catholic says, Testis, magistra, judex,—the Church witnesses, proposes, defines; the Developmentists say, the Church develops, defines, proposes; but as she defines only on the occasion of controversy, she proposes nothing to be believed till it has been controverted. Trace, then, the history of the controversies respecting the faith, and you will trace the history of the Church's formal or authoritative teaching, and ascertain the exact order and progress of development. The assumption here is, that the date of the controversy is the date of the formal or explicit admission of the article into the creed. Thus, purgatory, though held by many as opinion, was not of faith till after Aerius denied it in the fourth century. Here is the common Protestant assumption, and that of Anglicans in particular.
It is easy now to comprehend why some Catholics have mistaken the real character of this theory. There are two things which Catholics always keep distinct, — the Church's teaching, and the historical evidence of her teaching. The Church herself is the only competent witness to the former. She is one in time as well as in space. Knowing what she teaches to-day, we know what the Apostles taught, — what she has taught in every age since, and will continue to teach till the consummation of the world. It never occurs to us to resort to history to find what she taught in this or that age, for, to determine that, we have only to ask what she teaches now. In her teaching there is no progress, no variation, no development.
But in the historical evidence of her teaching, which is a matter of no moment to the faithful, the case is different; for the evidence follows not the teaching, but the controversies respecting it, and in it there is a progress or development; because the several articles of the creed, as an historical fact, have been, prior to our day, not all controverted at once, but successively. Now, if you predicate developments of the teaching, you unquestionably err ; but if you predicate them of the historical evidence of the teaching, you may be substantially correct. The former is so gross an error, that very few Catholics have been able to believe that such men as Mr. Newman and his friends could possibly fall into it; and therefore, making liberal allowances for their inaccuracies of language and frequent confusion of thought, not unaccountable in men trained in an erroneous system of philosophy and theology, and not yet fully instructed in the truth, have supposed they must really mean the latter, in which sense the greater part of what they say can be suffered to pass. So supposing, although regarding the theory with no especial favor, they have not believed it necessary to make any outcry against it, and have looked upon our attacks upon it as uncalled for, and, in fact, unjust, because we take the theory in a sense — authorized, indeed, by some few passages — which is not the sense really intended by its authors. In this view of the case they are right, and we are inexcusable, and deserving severer censures than we have received.
Now we frankly concede that a very considerable portion of Mr. Newman's Essay may be interpreted on this hypothesis ; but if it should be, why has not the Reviewer told us so ? If the subject of the developments be not Christian doctrine y but the historical evidence of Christian doctrine, why, since the distinction has been suggested to the friends of Mr. Newman more than once, have they not said so ? We have good authority for saying it is not so. The fact is, they do not make or admit this distinction, save in a very few cases. They begin with the assumption, that what is not explicitly recognized in the history of the Church's teaching in a given age was not, as a general rule, in that age explicitly taught, and therefore they conclude that they must predicate generally of the Church's teaching what they find to be true of the historical evidence of her teaching. We shall do these gentlemen essential injustice, if we interpret their theory from the Catholic, instead of the Protestant, point of view. They assume in the outset that all which Protestants allege as to Roman additions to the primitive creed is true, only that what Protestants call additions should be called developments. They agree precisely with their former Anglican friends on the main point, that there are doctrines to be found in the Church's teaching to-day which were not in her primitive teaching. Their theory is an expedient for asserting the Anglican antecedent and escaping the Anglican consequent. On the main point controverted between Protestants and Catholics, for these three hundred years, as to these pretended additions, they take, as they always did, the Anglican side, and are, as before, at issue with all our Catholic divines. Here, say they, are the facts. The stationariness of doctrine contended for by Roman divines cannot be maintained with truth ; and you must either call these facts additions with Anglicans or developments with us. If you call them additions, you must renounce your Church. If you will not admit them to be developments, you cannot maintain your Church. The evidence of history is overwhelming against you. It is either our theory, or no Catholicity. This is the alternative these modest gentlemen present to the Catholic Church.*(footnote; * We find a confirmation of what we here state, in another article in the number of the Review before us. The Reviewer says, p. 307, — " Various Anglican writers have lately maintained or implied that the historical arguments, adduced by writers of their school, have driven Catholics to the necessity of devising a new theory." Now these Anglican writers referred to distinctly state the theory to be precisely what we state it to be ; and they do pretend that Catholics have been forced to abandon the doctrine wo oppose to it. But how does the Reviewer meet this l By showing that they misunderstand or misrepresent the theory? Not at all, — but by denying the theory to be a novelty, and maintaining " that the said theory was fully recognized by doctors of the highest repute in the Church centuries before they or their arguments were heard of." —Hid.
We will add here, that, in speaking of the Developmentists, we do not include in their number all the recent converts from Anglicanism. How large a number embrace the theory we know not; but we have authority for including none but Mr. Newman and six others; yet these are all whose publications, since their conversion, we have seen, and they now evidently have the Dublin Review for their organ. We will state still further, that we have proceeded in examining the theory on the assumption that it is a well-defined theory, distinctly and systematically drawn out, and with regard to which there is no difference of opinion among the Developmentists ; but in reality this is not the case. They do not, as we have authority for asserting, agree among themselves ; and we suppose the truth to be, that none of them have any clear, distinct, and precise views of what it is they are contending for ; and if they could for a moment forget their theory, they would no doubt readily admit that it was never in reality for them more than " much ado about nothing."--end of footnote) Let them deny it, if they can. Would to God they could deny it, and prove us to have misrepresented them. We demand of them an explicit statement on this point, whether we state the case correctly, or whether we misrepresent them. That we do not misrepresent the Dublin Review is certain. The Reviewer writes with much finesse, and, like every member of the school, makes a statement, then qualifies it away, and then qualifies away his qualification. But he plainly intimates to us, p. 352, that, even if we should refute his theory, the facts which have suggested it, and, as he maintains, are recognized by the theologians he has cited, will remain to be disposed of. He evidently believes that history presents an obstacle, as Mr. Newman expresses it, to communion with Rome, which cannot be removed without some theory or hypothesis ; and this obstacle is precisely, in his mind, the discrepancy or difference which Protestants say history presents between the actual Church and the Church of the primitive age. He will not take the testimony of the Church herself, that she has never varied ; for he thinks he finds historical evidence to the contrary. Now this variation, difference, discrepancy, between the actual Church and the primitive, he says, virtually, remains to be explained, and that it devolves on Catholics to explain it. We answer him very briefly with the Catholic formula, — the Church is infallible, and is in each age the continuation and witness of the Church in the age next preceding; and by it we are placed in communion with the Apostles and they with us. We have no difficulties to explain. We deny your assumption, on her infallible authority, and assert, that, if you undertake to maintain it, you will find yourself, ipso facto, a heretic. O my brother, are you a Catholic, and have not yet learned that the Church is higher than history and philosophy ? Have you not yet learned that the difficulties are for those who do not believe, and not for those who do ? Let all the objections from history and philosophy, which schismatics, heretics, infidels, wicked men on earth, or devils in hell can bring, be brought against my poor servant girl, who cannot read a word, and she has but to say credo, and they melt and vanish into vacuity. O, do not ask us for theories, for we believe; and when we have faith, we are done with theories. Make your act of faith, be contented with what contented those who endured reproach for the Church, and shared her consolations, when you and we were wallowing in the filth of our heresy and schism and infidelity, and you will behold the immaculate Spouse herself, and draw milk from her breasts, and your heart will be too full of love and gratitude to be thinking of theories. As yet you dream not how glorious, how lovely, how rich in graces, how full of truth and sanctity, is this dear mother who has taken us to her bosom, spread her own robe over our nakedness, and called us her children. Tear away the bandage your theory binds over your eyes, and lo ! a vision of loveliness, of purity, of truth, of majesty, stands before you, that infinitely surpasses all you have yet imagined, — your heart and mind are filled, your soul is entranced, and you exclaim, " O my God, what am T, that this blessedness should be for me ? "
We here close what we have to say on this subject for the present. We need not say how bitterly we regret the necessity of taking part in so painful a controversy, or that we should shrink from it, if we were not encouraged and sustained by those who have authority to teach. We have endeavoured to treat the gentlemen who advocate this horrible theory, personally, with forbearance and respect; for we regard their error as resulting from the mistake they made of fancying their form of Anglicanism to be simple schism, not heresy, which prevented them, on their accession to the communion of the Church, from attending as they otherwise would have done to what they had to learn and to unlearn. They have, unhappily, given the devil an opportunity to take his revenge for their defection. But for Catholics no evil is irreparable. They will most
likely be obliged at last to abandon their theory ; and if they are not yet convinced that they must do so, they yet will do well to desist for a time from urging it upon the public. We have spoken to them plainly, but not unkindly, if seemingly uncour-teously. If in any thing we have wronged them, we ask their pardon in advance, and shall only need to have the wrong pointed out to retract it, and to make all the amends for it in our power.